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ABSTRACT 
This research evaluates the feasibility of introducing all-volunteer military 
recuitment in the Republic of Korea (ROK).  The ROK plans to reduce military 
manpower strength from 681,000 to 500,000 by 2020.  The ROK’s plan to downsize 
military manpower could raise popular expectations for a radical change in the military 
personnel system, such as eliminating the draft and moving toward an all-volunteer force.  
Issues of military misconduct, conscientious objection, draft evasion, and an unequal 
distribution of military service across the sexes were not fully resolved under the draft.  
In terms of opportunity cost, the draft imposes an economic burden on young people.  
Further, the present draft may not be suitable for a high-technology military that no 
longer needs massive numbers of personnel.  This study analyzes the type of military 
service system Korea maintains at present, using key defining indicators, and evaluates 
the suitability of Korea’s current military/economic/political/social factors for voluntary 
recruitment through an open-systems conceptual model.  Results indicate that the draft 
should be maintained for the near future, but this does not preclude changes in the current 
system.  In the long run, a gradual transition to voluntary recruitment appears necessary 
to develop a quality-focused approach to military resources that is in line with national 
defense reforms and the changing aspects of warfare.  The ROK should consider a phase-
to-phase transition toward volunteer-driven recruitment, as it eventually brings an end to 
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A. BACKGROUND  
The army of the Republic of Korea (ROK)  is promoting long- and mid-term 
plans that include a shift from a scale-focused army to an information/knowledge-driven 
and technology-focused corps of elite troops that can actively cope with the changes of 
war in modern times.  Such visions are well described in Defense Reform Plan (DRP) 
2020.  
DRP 2020 was designed to modernize  equipment and improve the qualitative 
characteristics of the military while reducing the quantity of manpower and weapons 
systems.  The ROK plans to reduce military manpower strength from 681,000 to 500,000 
by 2020.  To make up for the manpower reduction, military capabilities will be increased.  
This is a natural evolution, given changes in the nature of the North Korean military 
threat as well as economic growth, technological advancements, and socio-political 
developments in the ROK.  In light of a radically decreasing population in the male-youth 
cohort, due to a low fertility rate, a reduction of military manpower is inevitable.  
The ROK’s plan to downsize military manpower could raise popular expectations 
for a radical change in the military personnel system, such as the possibility of doing 
away with the draft and moving toward an all-volunteer force (AVF).  This highly 
political issue had been raised in meetings objecting to the draft and by some anti-war 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  According to these groups, the draft is not 
suitable for a high-technology military that no longer needs massive numbers of 
personnel. 
Furthermore, issues of military misconduct, conscientious objection, draft evasion, 
and an unequal distribution of military service across the sexes were not fully resolved 
under the draft.  In terms of opportunity cost, the draft raised the economic burden of the 
people.  As militaries across the world downsized their forces, some felt that the need for 
a relatively large force had passed.  Nevertheless, strong support remained for the draft, 
since there were no plans to downsize the ROK military.  But if the Ministry of National 
Defense (MND) reduces the quantity of military manpower under the DRP, this political 
2 
issue could come under the spotlight again.  Doubts about retaining the draft would likely 
resurface and calls for an AVF would occur once more.  In particular, a radical political 
party would most certainly raise the possibility of switching to an AVF.  
At the same time, a number of factors argue against ending the draft entirely.  
Though the military pursues an army equipped with cutting-edge technology, the funds 
necessary to fully complete modernization cannot be raised in a short term.  So, gradual 
changes should be introduced. That is, while admitting the limitations of reality, the 
MND should endeavor to bring changes to the current military service system in phases 
rather than immediately.  Also, in view of the current values and customs of military 
service in South Korea, introducing a voluntary system could cause the army to lose its 
social representation as “the army of the people.”  Further, some questions remain as to 
whether Korea can afford a voluntary system based on its economic power.  Also, the 
continuing confrontation with the North makes it difficult to be optimistic about national 
security.  
To sum up, a sharp divide exists between those who support a voluntary system 
due to the ill effects of the current system and those who favor conscription because of 
economic realities.  In view of the global changes made to armies and the changing 
conditions of war, we can expect continuing discussion and debate. Thus, we should 
determine which type of military service is best suited for the country, given our present 
understanding of its defense needs. 
 
B. MANPOWER PROBLEMS  
The ROK’s armed forces have a few problems to be solved or improved in terms 
of operating manpower.  First, the ROK’s military service system is based on the low cost 
of manpower, which means a large, labor-intensive army.  This structure relies on a large 
quantity of minimally skilled soldiers rather than on qualitative management.  Although 
the government has long pursued a “small but strong” army as well as “a few good men” 
systems, the slogans have not been put into practice.  The standing force of 600,000 
military personnel from the 1970s has now risen to 680,000.  Numerically, the ROK army 
is ranked sixth in the world, but military spending per soldier is ranked 62nd, far below 
3 
that of an advanced army.  Such a labor-intensive army is not suitable for a modern 
military system.  This system has resulted from the easy recruiting of soldiers through 
conscription as well as limited budgets and the role of South Korean soldiers under the  
joint ROK-U.S. defense system against the North, which is centered on a ground army.  
Second, with respect to ranks and service types, the Korean military system has a 
high ratio of soldiers with short-term and mandatory service.  About 75 percent of 
soldiers are conscripted and serve for a short time while commissioned officers, warrant 
officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) account for only about 25 percent of the 
force.  The ratio of privates to officers is the highest in the world.1  Meanwhile, about 
half the commissioned officers and NCOs are not professional soldiers but serve only for 
a short term through mandatory service.  Therefore, about 80 percent of the Korean 
soldiers serve in the army for less than three years.  The MND desires to transition to a 
more professional, volunteer military, and the ROK has used the current high national 
level of unemployment to recruit more volunteers.  Even so, the number of young men 
volunteering to be officers or NCOs without prior service represents only about  six 
percent of the young male population.  Many of these volunteers join to avoid the draft 
and would not volunteer without it.2 
Further, a system of “mass-recruitment – short-term operation – mass-discharge” 
has been maintained.  Due to the high ratio of short-term soldiers, a large number of 
soldiers are brought in, but they are utilized only for a while before being discharged.  As 
a result, manpower utilization is inefficient compared with the costs. About 250,000 new 
soldiers are recruited every year, but the same number of trained soldiers is discharged.  
Therefore, the costs of training and administration are high while the retention of 
specialized and experienced soldiers is greatly limited.  
Additionally, women and technical staffs are not utilized effectively.  Female 
soldiers account for only 0.5 percent of the army and 2.3 percent of commissioned 
officers and NCOs.  Women can hardly be found among officials of the MND and the 
                                                 
1 Young Jin Cho, Kwan Ho Cho, Kil Ho Chung, Ju Sung Chung, Won Bae Lee and Ahn Sik Kim, 
“Defense Manpower Development Plan for an Elite Force,” KIDA, 2005, p. 5. 
2 Bruce W. Bennett, “A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea’s Defense Reform Plan,” RAND, 
2006, p. 15. 
4 
military services.  Women rarely perform managerial functions.  In addition, the relative 
size of technical staffs is significantly low, even among public and military officials.  
 
C. THE ROK DEFENSE REFORM PLAN 2020 
The MND introduced the DRP 2020 in September 2005.  To build a smaller yet 
stronger defense force, the ROK military has been restructured and modernized over the 
years.  Taking a long-term vision until 2020, the new DRP aims to further transform the 
defense force from one that is manpower-intensive, military-dominated, and service-
oriented to a technology-intensive, civilian-dominated, and jointness-oriented force 
structure .   
Military transformation is a necessary means for resolving problems that have 
existed in the ROK defense force over the past five decades and not a mere fad in the era 
of information and globalization.  The MND has divided its overarching imperatives into 
five categories:3  
1.  Reducing military manpower and correcting the service composition, 
2.  Civilianizing the defense ministry,  
3.  Strengthening the Joint Chiefs of Staff system, 
4.  Securing the long-term defense budget, and  
5.  Maintaining and developing the ROK-U.S. alliance within a cooperative, 
self-reliant security framework.   
The government must obtain nationwide political support to legalize the specific 
policy measures needed to achieve successful defense reform in the long term.  In 
particular, the government will need to steadily increase the defense budget to finance the 
reform plan and coordinate, as well as closely cooperate, with the United States to 
manage the impact of defense reform on the alliance.   
Among the five imperatives listed above, correcting the force structure and 
securing the defense budget necessary for  reform  will have the greatest direct effect on 
future manpower policy.  Planned changes to the force structure will mean reducing the 
present force of 680,000 to an elite force of 500,000 by the year 2020.  As shown in 
Table 1, the strength of the army will be reduced from 548,000 to 371,000, the navy from 
                                                 
3 “The Defense Reform Plan 2020,” ROK MND, Seoul, 2005. 
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68,000 to 64,000, while that for the air force will remain unchanged at 65,000.  The ROK 
military will acquire state-of-the-art weapons systems to address force shortages resulting 
from the manpower reductions.  Besides trimming down the volunteer force, the defense 
ministry intends to cut back the reserve force by half to 1.5 million, and improve the 
training of the reserve force. 
 





Army Navy Air Force Reserve 
2007 548,000 68,000 65,000 3,000,000 
Reduction -177,000 -4,000 0 -1,500,000 
By 2020 371,000 64,000 65,000 1,500,000 
Source: “The Defense Reform Plan 2020,” ROK MND, Seoul, 2005, p. 5. 
 
The reform plan will need to be financed at a total cost of 621 trillion won, 
including operation and management costs (349 trillion won) and investment costs (272 
trillion won).  This will mean increasing the defense budget at a rate of 9.9 percent per 
annum between 2006 and 2010, 7.8 percent between 2011 and 2015, and 1.0 percent 
between 2016 and 2020. 
The ROK’s planned reform differs from that of the post-Cold War U.S. and 
European defense reforms, which reduced both manpower and budgets to provide more 
money for domestic needs.  The DRP seeks to improve the qualitative characteristics of 
the ROK military even as it reduces military manpower and the number of weapons 
systems.  It aims to sustain defense capabilities by obtaining better equipment and higher-
quality personnel—as suggested by the U.S. Department of Defense—i.e., to trade 
quantity for quality. 
A critical component of the reform is the move to achieve a better balance among 
the services.  Thus far, the army has comprised 80 percent of the ROK military and 
6 
commands a commensurate degree of control in the various joint activities.  Almost all of 
the force reductions will occur in the army, thereby balancing joint assignments with 
army personnel holding only half of the total positions. 
 
D. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
This study, consisting of six chapters, aims to evaluate the propriety of voluntary 
recruitment in Korea, in the face of that society’s demand for changes, and to present a 
reasonable direction for policy.  Chapter II explores a conceptual model of a military 
organization based on an open-system, to identify Korea’s current framework and to 
explore various alternatives.  Also, the military service system is examined in terms of its 
economic and social costs, including the opportunity costs of those who are conscripted.  
Chapter III covers military service systems and their general theories.  The 
concepts, types, and cases of the service systems are reviewed to better understand how 
the systems have been developed.  
Chapter IV evaluates the design factors of Korea’s military service system 
through a conceptual model.  Rather than using the two-sided approach of conscription 
versus voluntary systems, the various characteristics of these systems are applied to study 
the current Korean army, and to determine if a combination of elements might be more 
appropriate.  
Chapter V examines changes in the military environments and political issues. A 
number of factors are involved in determining a military service system and its structure, 
including microscopic/macroscopic and international/domestic matters, so that the study 
is not limited to a single factor.  Chapter V also ponders whether the 
military/economic/political/social factors in Korea are suitable for voluntary recruitment 
using the conceptual model.  
Finally, conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapter VI.  Included 
here are suggestions for how Korea might meet the defense needs and challenges of the 
future. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR DEFENSE ORGANIZATION 
 
1. An Open Systems Model 
System theory is basically concerned with problems of relationships, structures, 
and interdependence, rather than with the constant attributes of objects.4  Richard Scott 
writes that “all systems are characterized by an assemblage or combination of parts 
whose relations make them interdependent but they also suggest the bases for the 
differences among them.” 5   According to David Nadler and Michael Tushman, 
organizations have the characteristics of an open system within a larger environment.6   
A key assumption to open systems theory is that organizations are recognized as 
purposive—goals that define desired outcomes and a boundary determine the 
environment, as shown in Figure 1.  The boundary varies in terms of permeability.  




Figure 1.  Open Systems Theory: Organizations are Purposive Systems 
                                                 
4 Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, “Organizations and the System Concept,” The Social Psychology of 
Organizations, 1966, p. 3.  
5 W. Richard Scott, “Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems,” Fifth Edition, 2002. 
6 David A. Nadler and Michael Tushman, “A Congruence Model for Diagnosing Organizational 
Behavior,” in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin and Joyce S. Osland., The Organizational Behavior Reader, 








Figure 2 presents an open systems model.  Inputs are environments plus other 
factors, such as resources and history.  Strategy is based on an assessment of environment 
and then a critical determinant of design characteristics of the system.  Design features 
consist of three elements—tasks, stucture, and people.  In an open systems model, outputs 
affect the entire process through feedback. Ongoing adjustments are based on feedback 
from different goals and measures.   
 
 
Source: Adapted from Nadler, David A. and Tushman, Michael, “A Model for Diagnosing 
Organizational Behavior:  Applying a Congruence Perspective,” Organizational Dynamics:  Autumn 1980. 
Figure 2.  An Open Systems Model 
 
2. A Conceptual Model for Defense Organization 
Figure 3 presents a conceptual model for defense organizations related to the issue 
of the military service system.  This model demonstrates the open systems character of 
the military organization and highlights the close interrelationship between military, 
economic, political, and social components in its environment.  
We need to set the right defense objective to use the conceptual model for a 
defense organization, because it is not easy to find a reliable measure of military output in 
peacetime.  This means that it is very important to decide how we determine the defense 
objective.  In peacetime, the best result can be maintaining readiness or managing the 
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military organization effectively and efficiently with limited resources.  The defense goal 
can be found in a Defense White Paper.  To achieve national security goals and defense 
objectives in the ROK armed forces, the MND consistently focuses military 
competencies on the following key defense points: “establishing a firm defensive posture 




Source: Nadler, David A. and Tushman, Michael, “A Congruence Model for Diagnosing 
Organizational Behavior,” in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin and Joyce S. Osland., The Organizational 
Behavior Reader, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1991). 
Figure 3.  A Conceptual Model of the Defense Organization 
 
With an analysis of resources and envrionments, the conceptual model determines 
the policy/strategy to meet the defense goal that the military wants to shape.  The goal is 
not only the decision itself but also the means to achieve the vision.  Successful 
achievement of the defense goal will occur through the interaction of military factors.  
These outcomes will affect each step through the feedback process to meet the vision. 
The vision may even change according to a change  in the environment.    
This study aims to evaluate the feasibility of using voluntary recruitment in Korea 
to achieve the defense goal through a conceptual model.  The present study estimates 
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what type of military service system Korea maintains at present by providing the critical 
indicators for defining the military service type and ponders whether the 
military/economic/political/social factors of Korea are suitable for voluntary recruitment 
using the conceptual model. 
 
B. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MILITARY SERVICE SYSTEMS 
1. Economic Cost 
Economic cost is defined as the opportunity cost of serving in the military.  An 
individual’s opportunity cost consists of foregone civilian wages plus the net value the 
individual places on the nonpecuniary aspects of civilian life as compared with military 
life.  The standard labor supply model provides the basic framework to measure 
economic cost.  Aggregating individuals’ willingness to provide labor services at 
increasing prices, we derive the labor supply curve as seen in Figure 4, which shows the 
number of individuals who will voluntarily join the military for any given wage.8 
 
Source: Adapted from Cooper, Richard V. L., “Military Manpower and theAll-Volunteer Force,” 
(Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corparation, 1977), p. 72. 
Figure 4.  Measuring the Economic Cost of Military Manpower 
 
                                                 












Supppose that the military demands a force of M personnel.  In the case of a 
volunteer force, the military must establish a wage (W’) that will attract M volunteers, as 
displayed in Figure 4.  The M volunteers are individuals whose opportunity cost of 
military service is less than or equal to W’.  The opportunity cost of the volunteer force is 
the sum of the opportunity costs of the M volunteers (area SOMb).  Under the draft, the 
government sets a lower wage (W*) and consequently attracts only V volunteers.  The 
opportunity cost of the draft depends on the method of conscripting to meet the shortfall 
of M - V personnel. 
 
2. Budget Cost 
Budget cost simply equals the number of military personnel times the average 
wage rate.  Economic rent is the excess wage over that for which an individual will serve 
voluntarily, i.e., the difference between the wage an individual receives and his supply 
price is equal to his or her economic rent.  Budget costs under the draft will be less than 
under the volunteer system.  However, budget costs are actually lower than they appear, 
because some of the “economic rent”9 will return to the government as income taxes 
collected from the military personnel.  
 
Source: Adapted from Cooper, Richard V. L., “Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force,” 
(Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1977), p. 92. 
Figure 5.  Economic and Budget Cost of Military Manpower 
                                                 











As shown in Figure 5, economic rent is the amount by which the total budget cost, 
which equals W* times V, exceeds the economic cost, which is the area under the supply 
curve.  This economic rent is merely a transfer payment from taxpayers to those serving 
in the military and “does not reflect ‘real’ economic activity.”10 
 
3. Conscription Tax 
A country that maintains a relatively large military force, as compared with its 
population size, has a tendency to adopt conscription.  According to Cooper, 
“conscription is the standard method of manpower procurement when a country 
maintains a very large military force relative to its population.”11  
Conscription imposes an implicit tax on young men of military age.  While this 
conscription tax is not reflected in the accounts of any government agency or revenue 
collector, it is a real cost for those forced to pay it.12 
Assuming that individuals qualified for military service are only concerned with 
the level of monetary income, the conscription tax is the difference between the wage that 
will induce a conscripted soldier to volunteer and the actual draft wage, i.e., the tax 
equals the difference between the supply price and the military wage for those who do not 
enter the military as volunteers.  For example, if a conscripted soldier can earn $10,000 as 
a civilian, and if his income in the armed forces is $5,000, his conscription tax is $5,000.  
This implicit tax can be defined as either the amount a person will pay to avoid 
military service or the difference between the military wage and that necessary to induce 
voluntary enlistment.  Ideally, the implicit tax can be estimated using either definition.  
For example, individual experiments can be carried out on conscript soldiers to obtain 
their preferences for civilian life over military service in terms of the increased taxes they 
are willing to pay to avoid service.  However, there are no such readily available data to 
estimate even approximate measures of this definition of the tax.  Figure 6 illustrates the 
other definition, which states that the implicit tax is the difference between the volunteer 
                                                 
10 Richard V. L. Cooper, “Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force,” p. 91. 
11 Ibid., p. 80. 
12 Ibid.  
13 
supply price and actual compensation.  If the military compensation level is W*, V true 
volunteers will enlist.  If the military requires M recruits, then M - V will be reluctant.  
They will only volunteer if the military wage is raised to level W’.  The implicit tax is 
represented by the hatched area under the supply curve for a completely volunteer force.  
The dotted area represents the foregone rents of the V true volunteers and the opportunity 
cost to the M - V conscripted soldiers.    
 
 
Source: Adapted from Cooper, Richard V. L., “Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force,” 
(Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Cooperation, 1977), p. 82. 
Figure 6.  Measuring the Conscription Tax 
 
According to J. Ronnie Davis and Neil Palomba, the implicit tax levied on an 
individual can be measured by the difference between a recruit’s foregone civilian 
earnings and his military compensation.13  This proxy measures the “financial cost,” 
presuming that a person is indifferent between civilian service and military service at the 
same wages.14  In Figure 7, the civilian income stream for one who begins civilian 
                                                 
13 J. Ronnie Davis and Neil A. Palomba, "On the Shifting of the Military Draft. as a Progressive Tax-
in-Kind," Western Economic Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1968, p. 151. 
14 Walter Y. Oi,“The Economic Cost of the Draft,” in Anderson, Martin with Barbara, Honegger, “The 
Military Draft,” Hoover Press Publication, p. 363. 
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14 
employment after two years of military service is represented by the line W’UST.  Davis 
and Palomba compute his loss for the two years of service as area W*W’UY.  However, 
his true implicit tax is given by the area W*W’SZY.   
 
 
Source: Oi, Walter Y., “The Economic Cost of the Draft,” in Anderson, Martin, Barbara, Honegger, “The 
Military Draft,” Hoover Press Publication, p. 363. 
Figure 7.  Impact on Civilian Income Streams of the Conscription Tax 
 
According to Cooper, it is important to make explicit the conscription tax because 
it affects resource utilization and support for the draft.  Under a draft system, the 
budgeted manpower expenditures is a substantial understatement of the true value of 
labor resources deployed in the military.  This often results in over-utilization of labor 
resources.  The conscription tax is also not equal across individuals; this inequity 
undermines support for the draft system.  Individuals facing high conscription taxes have 
an added incentive to try to avoid the draft.  Draft-avoidance costs should be included to 
determine the overall economic burden of the draft system.15 
 
                                                 













4.  Labor Utilization 
The preceding analysis considers supply-side issues.  Demand is an equally 
important aspect since the demand for military manpower is a downward-sloping 
function of cost.   
According to Cooper,  both income and subsitution effects work to bring about a 
downward-sloping demand curve for military personnel in the long run, i.e., as the price 
of manpower increases, fewer personnel are demanded, other things being equal.16  As 
the price of manpower increases, other military inputs become relatively less expensive, 
casuing the military to substitute these inputs for manpower (substitution effect).  The 
increase in the price of manpower makes it more expensive to maintain any given level of 
defense capability, causing the government to consume less defense services (income 
effect).  
The true economic cost is often not fully reflected in budgeted manpower 
expenditures.  Under a draft system, budgeted manpower expenditures understate the 
economic costs, resulting in overutilization of military manpower.  The converse may 
occur in the absence of a draft if the military is a monopsonistic employer facing an 
upward-sloping supply curve for labor.17  Figure 8 shows the deadweight loss arising 
under a draft (shaded area).  
                                                 




Source: Adapted from Cooper, Richard V. L., “Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force,” 
(Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1977), p. 76. 
Figure 8. Overemployment of Labor with the Draft 
 
5. Labor Turnover 
Manpower turnover rates vary inversely with the length of service (LOS).  The 
average LOS is shorter under a draft as compared to an all-volunteer force.  Manpower 
turnover rates are therefore higher for a draft system, negatively affecting military 
productivity and efficicency.  Conscription becomes an inefficient means for maintaining 
force strength if the LOS is very short, , especially when significant numbers of technical 
personnel are required.  For example, some jobs, such as drivng a tank or an armored 
fighting vehicle (AFV), require at least 12 months of training and experience to enable 
soldiers to perform well.  Figure 9 shows that a certain length of time is required for one 













Source: Adapted from Barron, John M. and Berger, Mark C., “On-the-Job Training,” W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research, 1997, p. 23. 
Figure 9.  Productivity by the Length of Service 
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III. BACKGOUND OF MILITARY SERVICE SYSTEM 
A. UNDERSTANDING MILITARY SERVICE 
 
1. Concepts of Military Service 
Defense power refers to the power of protecting and maintaining the lives and 
properties of people by establishing sovereignty through military means.18  A nation’s 
defense power is represented by its combat capability.  A key purpose of defense power 
is to repel the intrusion of foreign forces.  However, the more important goal is to deter 
aggression with solid military readiness.  Defense power is a function of trained 
manpower resources, firepower, and equipment.  Without well-trained soldiers, the battle 
cannot be won.  A military service requirement allows a nation to mobilize sufficient 
manpower to carry out military activities and prepare for war.   
The term “military service” refers to the carrying out of military service duties 
through enrollment in the military.19  Military service is service in the army, navy, air 
force, or any other military organization, either as a chosen job or as the result of a 
compulsory draft.  In general, there should be conviction that military service is a 
promise to the people of the country and that military service members must do their best 
mentally and physically in serving their country.  Military service therefore constitutes a 
kind of personal burden to meet military manpower demands.  
This concept of military service espouses basic values, which have been accepted 
since the emergence of modern democratic countries.  The origins of conscription can be 
traced back to the developments and processes set in motion across Europe by the French 
Revolution and Napoleonic wars. As a 1798 French Act stated during the Levée en Masse, 
“Any Frenchman is a soldier and owes himself to the defense of the nation.” 20  
Historically, after the French Revolution, France abolished absolute monarchy and the 
class system, choosing to adopt a  national system premised on equal civil rights.  As 
                                                 
18 Doo Sung Kim, “Military Manpower Affairs,” Seoul, Cheilsa, 2002, p. 13. 
19 Ibid., p. 14. 
20 Tomas Jermalavicius, “Conscription Debate in Lithuania : How to Approach the Issue?,” Baltic 
Defense Review No. 8 ,Vol. 2, 2002, p. 24. 
20 
opposed to the monarchy and the feudal system, citizens are the main body that should 
protect the country from others since the nation is now citizen-centered.  Defending the 
country becomes the general duty of all citizens.  Military service becomes an incarnation 
of a citizen’s status and rights. This link is one of the most powerful sustaining factors for 
conscription.  Although the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century has profoundly 
altered the character of war, it has also increased reliance on manpower resources to 
offset the increased destructive power of weapons and even facilitated manpower 
deployment through new inventions, such as railways and telegraph communications.21   
 
2. Types of Military Service Systems 
Generally, the military service system can be classified as either a compulsory 
system, a voluntary system, or even a hybrid of both, as shown in Figure 10.22    
 
Source: An, Seok-Ki, Jeong, Joo-Seong, Jeong, Won-Young, “New Environmental Change and 
Development of Military Service”, KIDA, 2003, p. 26. 
Figure 10.  Types of Military Service Systems 
 
a.  Compulsory Systems  
Under a compulsory system, military service is mandatory based on the 
concept that the citizens of a nation are responsible for the defense of their country.  The 
compulsory system can be further defined as either a drafting system or a militia system. 
                                                 
21 Alan Forrest, “Conscription as Ideology: Revolutionary France and the Nation in Arms,” The 
Comparative Study of Conscription in the Armed Forces, ed. Lars Mjoset and Stephen Van Holde (Oxford: 
Elsevier Science, Ltd, 2002), p. 95. 
22 Seok-Ki An, Joo-Seong Jeong, Won-Young Jeong, “New Environmental Change and Development 

















• Drafting system.  A drafting system is based on universal conscription.  
Every citizen is subject to the military service requirement.  Recruited 
soldiers undergo education and training to become elite soldiers.  Military 
service is for a set duration and soldiers are transferred to reserve units 
thereafter for mobilization during an emergency or for a war.  
• Militia system.  As with a drafting system, the militia system is also based 
on universal conscription.  The purpose of military training is to cultivate 
and maintain the military force economically.  The officer positions are 
filled with volunteers.  All citizens receive short-term basic military 
training and, in times of peace, people carry on with their lives.  In an 
emergency, such as a war, citizens are summoned for military service.  
 
b.  Voluntary Systems  
A volunteer military system is also called a free military system, whereby 
individuals enlist for military service of their own free will, signing a contract with the 
nation.  The professional soldier system, recruiting system, and mercenary system belong 
to this category.  
• Professional Soldier System.  Under this system, people are soldiers by 
profession.  Those who are willing to serve long-term in the military 
become commissioned or noncommissioned officers, and receive 
sufficient salary to support a family.  
• Recruiting System.  With a recruiting system, people sign a contract and 
serve in the military by enlisting in a specific armed force, service branch, 
and position.. 
• Mercenary System.  In a mercenary system, military service is primarily 
for personal financial enrichment.  The salary and service period are 
specified in a contract.  Foreigners may enlist for military service. A good 
example of the system from history is France’s Foreign Legion, which still 
exists today as a restructured, elite unit of mostly foreign volunteers. 
Each country has a different type of military service, depending on 
personnel/material availability and political conditions.  Three aspects of military service 
are particularly important in further defining it : military purpose (training, home defense, 
general); length of service (six months, a short tour up to three years, a long tour of more 
than three years, part-time reserve duty); and method of conscription (universal, random, 
class-based, selective).23  An analysis of military service systems is presented in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
23 Eliot A. Cohen, “Citizens and Soldiers – the dilemmas of military service,” Cornell University 
Press, 1985, p. 22. 
22 
Table 2.  Analysis of Military Service Systems 
 








Large masses of conscripts or volunteers 
are trained for war by a cadre of 
professional soldiers during peacetime.  
(The German Army 1920-1935) 





A short period of military instruction is 
required of all physically fit young men 
during high school or shortly after.   
(Pre-World War I Australia) 
Training Six Months Universal  
Militia 
Sporadic training during the year (e.g., a 
weekend a month) for men selected by a 
number of possible methods.  These men 
continue to pursue civilian careers and 
perform active duty only in times of 
invasion or general war.  
(United States National Guard, British 








Conscripts are trained and led by a cadre 
of professional NCOs and officers to 
become part of a nation’s standing force. 
(The Republic of Korea Army,  
United States Army 1948-1973) 








Volunteers, most of whom serve only one 
tour and then leave the military, are 
trained and led by a cadre of professional 
NCOs and officers. 
(United States Army 1973-present) 
General 




Long-tour compulsory military service 
for certain classes, e.g., day laborers and 
nobles.  Class-based statutory exemption 
of men from military service.  
(Frederician Prussia) 
General 
Purpose Long Tour Class-based 
Professional 
Military service regarded as a career by 
all including rank-and-file soldiers.   
(British Army from the 1700s to present, 
with the exception of the World Wars) 
General 





Military service selection on the basis of 
overall usefulness to the total (i.e., 
economic and military) war effort.   
(The United States 1914-1918,  
1940-1946) 
General 
Purpose Long Tour Selective 
 
Source: Cohen, Eliot A., “Citizens and Soldiers – the Dilemmas of Military Service,” Cornell University 
Press, 1985, p. 23. 
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Countries often adopt hybrid systems or have changed their military system for 
political, economic, social, and military reasons.  Hybrid systems are adopted in 
accordance with countries’ characteristics to provide the advantages of both the draft and 
volunteer systems.  Currently, South Korea has adopted a hybrid system encompassing 
the UMT, Cadre/Conscription, and Professional systems.  The United States Army has 
also changed its military service system for the same reasons. 
 
3. Determining Factors 
The means of acquiring the necessary manpower for military service, as well as 
the form of military service system, are determined by the nation’s structure and 
circumstances.  A policy decision on the appropriate military service system must be 
made after considering such factors as the geopolitical situation, propensities of 
neighboring states, political and economic situations, characteristics of people, society, 
culture, and climate.  In particular, countries have chosen their military service systems 
according to their unique interdependent political, economic, social, and military factors.  
Such factors are important considerations in the decision to change the military service 
system or retain the status quo.  For example, if there is a  significant military threat or 
budget constraints to reform because of the economic situation of the country, the 
existing military service system is likely to be retained.  If there is strong social demand 
by the people or sufficient capability to transform to an AVF system, a change in the 
military service system is probable.  The determining factors for the ROK military are 
analyzed in Chapter V . 
 
B. MILITARY SERVICE SYSTEMS OF MAJOR COUNTRIES 
 
1. France  
France has embarked on a series of reforms that have resulted in the downsizing 
of its military force.24  This came about as the security threats diminished with the end of 
the Cold War.  Three factors are shaping French and European post-Cold War militaries: 
                                                 
24 Ronald Tiersky, “French Military Reforms and Stategy,” Institute for National Strategic Studies and 
the National Defense University, 1996, p. 3. 
24 
1) disintegration of the Soviet Union; 2) budgetary pressures; and 3) new post-Cold War 
missions.25   The 1996 Chirac plan to downsize and modernize the French military, 
combined with similar British and German plans, outlines what the post-Cold War 
European military front will be.  The Chirac reform shrinks the military force from about 
500,000 to 350,000.  The resulting surplus of draftees and the need to maintain equity 
became major issues for the French military.  The service term had to be reduced to solve 
the problems.  To prevent combat strength from falling further, the French military 
expanded the volunteer system.  The French military eventually adopted the all-volunteer 
system in 2003, which consists of professional soldiers.26 
 
2. Germany  
Before reunification, Germany was a strong supporter of conscription and even 
lengthened the service term due to a lack of draftees.  However, the end of the Cold War 
and reunification eased tensions.  This reduced the need for a large military force while 
the number of conscripts increased, giving rise to problems similar to those of France.  
Despite efforts to adjust the system, maintaining equity became an issue and draft-
dodging kept increasing, given the sudden changes in national security.  The reduction in 
the service term failed to prevent draft evasion by German youth.  This led the German 
government to increase the number of alternative services while decreasing the number of 
conscripts.  The German military system is close to a  a voluntary system given the short 
length of service (nine months in the military or in an alternative civilian service).  It is 
possible that a completely voluntary system will be introduced soon.27   
 
3. Italy  
Italy has also drastically reduced its military force due to reduced tensions in the 
region and shortened the service term to manage the surplus of draftees.  To maintain its  
 
 
                                                 
25 Ronald Tiersky, “French Military Reforms and Stategy,” p. 1. 
26 Joo Seong Cheong, “Vision of Military Manpower Affairs and Policy,” KIDA, 2000, p. 95. 
27 Ibid., p. 87. 
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combat force, Italy has promoted voluntary systems, including the concept of a long-term 
service soldier, which is closer to a professional soldier.  The conversion to a completely 
voluntary system is currently being carried out in Italy.28  
 
4. Israel 
Israel faces daily security threats with its neighboring Arab countries.  Thus, 
Israel applies a complete and almost perfect conscription system to all its people, 
including women, to build a vast military force.  Exemption from military service is 
granted only for religious reasons.29   
 
5. Taiwan 
Changes in Taiwan’s military system are different from those of European 
countries.  Due to serious tensions between Taiwan and China, the Taiwanese 
government has maintained a strong conscription system, having all who are eligible 
complete military service.  Nevertheless, acknowledging the limitations of the traditional 
approach to warfare, which is dependent on conventional weapons and the size of 
military force, Taiwan has implemented plans for military reform and reduce the size of 
its army in the process.  Taiwan has therefore also reduced the service term to deal with 
the surplus of conscripts.  To prevent a weakening of the combat force, more voluntary 
soldiers, such as commissioned officers, are hired.30   
 
6. China 
China was a major axis in the Cold War and supported a strong conscription 
system, reflecting the characteristics of socialism.  However, alleviated tensions and loss 
of ideological conflict with the collapse of the socialist system, along with the pursuit of 
practical courses of action, led China to pursue a qualitatively, rather than a quantitatively, 
strong army.  As a result, China reduced its military force and service term in 1999.  
                                                 
28 Joo Seong Cheong, “Vision of Military Manpower Affairs and Policy,” p. 82. 
29 Dmitry Litovkin, Svetlana Babaeva, “A Prfessional Military: For and Against,” CDI Russia Weekly, 
2003, p. 2. 
30 Joo Seong Cheong, “Vision of Military Manpower Affairs and Policy,” KIDA, 2000, p. 87. 
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China’s military force now comprises compulsory and voluntary soldiers, with the focus 
on promoting the system of voluntary soldiers and not maintaining a large-scale military 




Russia has had a conscripted army since 1918, enlisting approximately 400,000 
young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-seven each year. 32   There is 
increasing draft avoidance in recent years with rising concerns about endemic hazing, 
deployment to Chechnya, or better career opportunities.33  Many cities throughout Russia 
face difficulty meeting draft quotas.  This has led military officials to cut conscription 
quotas; the quota was reduced by 20 percent in the spring of 2002, where just over 
160,000 draftees were required, as compared with about 200,000 people in each of the 
two conscription periods in the past.  In 2006, the Defence Ministry announced its plan to 
reduce the length of service to 18 months over time, accelerating earlier plans supported 
by the uniformed leadership which had foreseen the transition to a contracted, rather than 
conscripted force to start in 2011.34 
 
8. Japan 
Japan’s defense force was established under the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954 
and is under civilian control.35  The Japanese armed forces are meant to ensure self-
defense under the current Japanese constitution, although Japan has increased its Self 
                                                 
31 China’s National Defense in 2004, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic 
of China, Beijing, 2004. 
32 Human Rights Watch, “Conscription Through Detention in Russia’s Armed Forces,” Human Rights 
Watch Publication, Vol. 14, No.8, 2002, p. 1. 
33 Ibid., p. 2. 
34 Human Rights Watch, “Conscription Through Detention in Russia’s Armed Forces,” Human Rights 
Watch Publication, Vol. 14, No.8, 2002, p. 4. 
35 Global Security, “Military,” Adapted from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/jda.htm; Internet; Accessed 8 March 2007. 
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Defense Forces’ participation and role in international military activities, including 
peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and support for the reconstruction of Iraq.36   
 
9. United States 
The U.S. is currently the world’s police force and has adopted a completely 
voluntary system, on the assumption that direct security threats hardly occur within the 
country, except for terrorist attacks such as “9-11.”  However, the U.S. maintains reserve 
forces, which are trained similarly as the standing army and have the nature of 
professional soldiers.  Further, its military system is flexible enough to transform into a 
mandatory one if required.  Although the U.S. military relies heavily on high-cost and 
cutting-edge weapons, the military faces a challenge recruiting sufficient soldiers  when a 
military career loses its appeal to people.  Therefore, the U.S. spends a relatively large 
amount of money to maintain its military force through re-engagment bonuses, 
educational benefits, and so on.  Although the U.S. has adopted a completely voluntary 
system, it faces the problems of high expenses and loss of social representativeness in its 
military.37  
 
C.  CHARACTERIZING CHANGES IN MILITARY SERVICE SYSTEMS 
As seen here, the major trend in the military systems of major countries is a shift 
from conscription to the hybrid of mandatory and voluntary systems or to completely 
voluntary systems.  Countries that have introduced the hybrid system seem to have 
experienced a surplus of conscripts and a problem maintaining equity with the easing of 
security threats and reduction in military forces.  They shortened the military service term 
to resolve these problems and increased the number of voluntary soldiers to maintain 
combat strength.  Israel, on the other hand, has an existing security threat and therefore 
still strongly supports conscription.  As demonstrated by the U.S., countries intending to 
introduce voluntary systems will need to grapple with the problems of enormous 
expenses to find sufficient volunteers and loss of social representativeness in the military.  
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Three elements characterize the changes in military systems discussed above.  
First, changes in military systems are preceded by the easing of tensions and military 
reforms that result in a reduction in the military force.  Second, military reforms generally 
involve moving to a hybrid of mandatory and voluntary systems or a completely 
voluntary system.  Germany, Taiwan, and China are examples of countries that have 
adopted the hybrid system.  The reduced demand for conscripts, given a reduction in the 
military force, resulted in a surplus of draftees.  This increased the difficulty of 
maintaining equity amidst rising evasion of the draft.  The service term often had to be 
shortened to deal with these problems.  Germany, Taiwan, and China shortened the 
service term for these reasons as well as to ease the burden of military service at the same 
time.  These countries increased their corps of professional voluntary solders to 
strengthen their combat forces, which have been weakened by the reduction in the 
conscript force as well as the decrease in the number of experienced soldiers, given the 
shortened service term.  The hybrid system alleviated the side effects of introducing 
voluntary systems and allowed for a soft landing.  Third, countries that are easing up on 
conscription have introduced alternative forms of duty to solve the surplus of draftees.  
With strict restrictions on the number and stringent selection criteria, the equitableness of 
the military system can be maintained and draft-dodging reduced. 
In summary, military service system changes are driven by security conditions, 
military reforms, and the scale of military resources to be managed.  In particular, 
changes in security environment constitute the most important factor in deciding on the 
appropriate type of military service.  Changes in the type of military service must be 
enabled by substantial innovation in the national security system.  In Korea, as the last 
divided country in the world, the security environment has not significantly changed 
since the Cold War era.  However, recent reconciliation efforts with North Korea, an 
enhanced military capacity, and the citizens’ perception of a need for military service will 





IV. ANALYSIS OF MILITARY DESIGN FACTORS 
A. INDICATORS OF MILITARY DESIGN FACTORS 
This chapter analyzes military design factors to understand the current structure of 
the Korean army and its differences with other countries that maintain a voluntary service 
system or something similar to such a system.  By doing so, the potential of the Korean 
army for introducing a new system can be judged. 
Military design factors provide critical indicators for defining the military service 
type.  Five interdependent design factors can be identified within the military setup: task 
requirement, people, process/system, technology, and force structure, as shown in Figure 
11.  Haltiner proposes indicators to determine the service format according to these 
design factors, including the military participation ratio (MPR), conscript ratio (CR), 
gross national product (GNP) per capita, women’s participation rate and so on.38   
 
Source: David A. Nadler and michael Tushman, “A Congruence Model for Diagnosing Organizational 
Behavior,” in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin and Joyce S. Osland.  The Organizational Behavior Reader. 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1991) 
Figure 11.  Military Design Factors 
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Policy / Strategy Outcome
Task Requirement 
Force Structure 
- Conscript Ratio 
-  Reserve Ratio  
People 
- Military Participation Ratio  
of Military Age Cohorts  
- Quality  
- Ratio among officers NCOs 
and Enlisted Personnel 
Process / System 
- Length of Service 
- Recruiting System 
Training
Technology 
- Level of Technology 
(Modernization) 
Military Design Factors 
30 
The following analysis focuses on five feasible indicators relevant to the ROK 
military: overall CR, military participation ratio of the military-age cohort (MPRMAC), 
officers/NCOs/enlisted personnel ratios, conscript ratio in the air force (CRAF) and the 
navy (CRN), and length of service (LOS) to determine the most appropriate service 
format  for the ROK military.  These indicators are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3.  Military Design Indicators 
 
Indicators Description 
Overall Conscipt Ratio (CR) Significant indicator of a nation’s military organizational format 
Military Participation Ratio 
of the Military-Age Cohort 
(MPRMAC) 
Indicator of military service burden incidence 
Officers/NCOs/Enlisted 
Personnel Ratio 
Indicator for possibility of future military force 
reduction 
   Conscript Ratio in the    
Air Force (CRAF) and the 
Navy (CRN) 
Indicator of technology level 
Length of Service (LOS) Indicator to determine possibility of introducing a voluntary enlistment system 
 
1.  Overall Conscript Ratio (CR) 
The overall CR is defined as the ratio of draftees to all active members in the 
armed forces.  The internal stucture of military organizations can be reflected through the 
CR.  Therefore, the CR is one of the most significant indicators of a nation’s military 
organizational format.39  The classification (or type) of military organizations according 
to their CRs is shown in Figure 12.   
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Source: Haltiner, Karl W. “The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe,” Armed 
Forces and Society, Vol 25, 1998, p. 18. 
Figure 12.  A Typology Force Structure and Expected Changes 
 
a.  Type 0 (All-Volunteer Force) 
Countries with a CR of zero percent are considered to have an AVF.  
Zero-draft countries include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, 
and Japan.   
 
b.  Type I (Pseudo Conscript Force) 
Countries with a CR below 50 percent are considered to have a pseudo 
conscript force.  Type I military organizations are closer to the AVF than to a conscript 
force, since volunteers form the majority of the military force. 
 
c.  Type II (Softcore Conscript Force) 
Countries with a CR between 50 percent and 67 percent are considered to 
have a softcore conscript force.  According to Haltiner, Type II military organizations 
tend to conscript more selectively rather than universally. 40   As such, universal 
conscription is often brought up as a political issue, centering attention on the 
development of a more equitable military service system.  
                                                 
40 Karl W. Haltiner, “The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe,” Armed Forces and 
Society, Vol. 25, 1998, p. 17. 
Type III  (Hardcore Conscript Forces) 
Type II  (Softcore Conscript Forces) 
Type 0 (All-Volunteer Forces) 
Type I  (Pseudo Conscript Forces) 
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d.  Type III (Hardcore Conscript Force) 
Countries with a CR above 67 percent are considered to have a hardcore 
conscript force.  Switzerland has a near 100 percent CR and conscripts all its officers, 
similar to the militia system .   
In general, countries make gradual transitions from one format to another.  
Most European countries have changed their military systems from a Type III to a Type 
II and then to a Type I, before progressing to Type 0. 
 
2.  Military Participation Ratio of the Military Age Cohorts (MPRMAC) 
The MPR is defined as the size of the military force (actives and reserves) as a 
proportion of the country’s population.  The MPRMAC is defined as the ratio of draftees 
to all individuals belonging to particular age cohorts. 41   According to Haltiner, the 
MPRMAC indicates how the military service burden is distributed.42  Even if a nation 
conscripts only a small proportion of its force, its MPRMAC can still indicate an 
equitable distribution of the military service burden if it uses an appropriate military 
system.  Similar to the CR, MPRMAC also helps categorize military organizations.   
 
3.  Officers/NCOs/Enlisted Personnel Ratio 
The commissioned officer/NCO/enlisted personnel ratio is a critical indicator for 
the future reduction of military forces and introduction of a voluntary system.43  In a 
technology-oriented army, the percentage of NCOs who are skilled soldiers is relatively 
high, and an effective army can be maintained.  The percentage of enlisted personnel will 
also be high in countries that support conscription, while the percentage of commissioned 
officers is about 10-15 percent.  This is similar to a voluntary enlistment system.  The 
percentage of NCOs will be higher the closer the military service format is to a voluntary  
 
 
                                                 
41 Karl W. Haltiner, “The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe,” Armed Forces and 
Society, Vol. 25, 1998, p. 19. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Young Jin Cho, “Defense Manpower Management for Technology-intensive Forces,” KIDA, 2006, 
p. 20. 
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system, leading to a more effective army, since more skilled personnel are employed.  As 
the percentage of volunteers increases, transition to a voluntary system is easier, since it 
becomes less difficult to recruit soldiers voluntarily.  
4.  Conscript Ratio in the Air Force (CRAF) and the Navy (CRN) 
The level of military technology can be inferred from the percentage of conscripts 
serving in a country’s air force and navy.44  Judging by the CRAF and CRN indicators of 
different military organizational formats, Type I and Type II military forces exhibit a 
distinctly higher level of technology than Type III forces.  Under a Type III military 
organizational format, all services of the armed forces resemble a mass army.  
Signficantly more volunteers than conscripts are utilized in the air force and navy in Type 
I or II military forces.  A country’s air force and navy play an important role in the 
transformation to a professional force. 
 
5.  Length of Service (LOS) 
The length of service can be used as a yardstick to determine the possibility of 
introducing a voluntary enlistment system. 45   The shorter the term, the higher the 
potential.  The terms of military service have been shortened in many countries to deal 
with a declining youth population or a surplus of conscripts.  The reduced service term 
results in an increased number of NCOs.  In general, the minimum service term is one 
year, since the nature of military duties requires soldiers to receive at least a year of 
military education to cultivate the military spirit and build up capabilities to carry out 
military duties.  However, one year of training may be too short, since effective combat 
capability is obtained only after a year.  Most countries maintaining a conscription system 
require two years of military service. 
 
B. ANALYSIS OF INDICATORS FOR THE ROK MILITARY 
Based on the research results of Haltiner, the indicators to determine the 
respective military organizational formats are provided in Table 4.  For example, the CR 
                                                 
44 Karl W. Haltiner, “The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe,” Armed Forces and 
Society, Vol. 25, 1998, p. 22. 
45 Seok-Ki An, Joo-Seong Jeong, Won-Young Jeong, “New Environmental Change and Development 
of Military Service,” KIDA, 2003, p. 83. 
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is > 67 percent for a Type III military force, 50-66 percent for a Type II force, and < 50 
percent for a Type I force.  In terms of MPRMAC and CRAF/CRN, > 60 percent, 30-60 
percent, < 30 percent will reflect a Type III, II and I force, respectively.  As for the 
commissioned officers/NCOs/enlisted personnel ratio, the percentage of commissioned 
officers is 10-12 percent in all three formats, while the ratio of NCOs to enlisted 
personnel is 20:70, 29:60, and 38:50 in a Type III, II and I force, respectively.  The 
mandatory service term is > 19 months for a Type III force and < 12 months for a Type I 
force.  The results of applying Haltiner’s criteria for defining a conscription system to the 
ROK militray are also presented in Table 4.  
 
Table 4.  Military Design Indicators for the ROK Armed Forces 
 
 Type III Type II Type I ROK  Results 
Overall Conscipt Ratio (CR) Above 67 % 50-67 % Below 50 % 77% 
Type 
III 
Military Participation Ratio 
of the Military-Age Cohort 
(MPRMAC) 




Personnel Ratio 10:20:70 11:29:60 12:38:50 10:15:75 
Type 
III 
   Conscript Ratio in the    
Air Force (CRAF) and the 
Navy (CRN) 
Above 60 % 30-60 % Below 30 % Navy: 45% 
Air Force: 55% 
Type II 
Length of Service (LOS) 
(Months) 
Over 19 12-18 Less than 12 
Army:24 
Navy: 26 




Source: Based on methodology presented in Haltiner, Karl W. “The Definite End of the Mass Army in 
Western Europe,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol 25, 1998, p. 18. 
 
According to Haltiner’s criteria, all the ratios except the ratio of draftees for the 
air force/navy, indicate that the Korean military system is Type III (Hardcore Conscript).  
This implies that the current system will have to be maintained for the time being, since 
the introduction of a voluntary system requires a country to transition through a Type II 
and then a Type I military format.   
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The ROK military is an enlisted personnel-intensive system.  The ROK military 
manpower force structure can be defined as “an excessively personnel-centric 
structure.”46  The ROK armed forces accession system heavily depends on the nation’s 
compulsory military service requirement.  The ROK military has never had a problem 
filling recruiting quotas, unlike the U.S. military, which is currently experiencing 
recruiting problems in its army and certain reserve branches.47   
The recent DRP 2020 report presented South Korea’s plans to increase the ratio of 
more skilled NCOs and lengthen the service term of those who have completed their 
service by another six months or one year by paying a salary equivalent to that of a 
college student or novice employee.  In addition, the ROK military intends to recruit 
soldiers with special skills in various fields to make use of their college major or interests.  
There is ongoing research to study the possibility of shortening the conscript period from 
24 months to 18 months to ease the people’s burden of military duty.  All of these plans 
demonstrate that Korea is undergoing a shift from Type III (Hardcore Conscript) to Type 
II (Softcore Conscript).  
                                                 
46 Chung Je Park, “The Direction of ROK Military Defense Reform,” Korea Defense Review, 
September 2005, p. 84. 
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V. ANALYSIS  OF THE ROK MILITARY MANPOWER FORCE 
STRUCTURE FACTORS  
This chapter applies previous research on the criteria for choosing a military 
system.  These criteria consider selecting factors, the characteristics of a country that 
chooses a voluntary or mandatory system, and the goals to be pursued by the military 
systems.  Although the selecting factors vary according to researchers, 
military/economic/political/social circumstances are the most desirable factors.  
Additionally important, especially, the degree of threats from the outside, economic 
power, population and the number of draftees. Social conditions are considered important 
as applicable data are analyzed in a number of ways and the characteristics of each 
country are taken into consideration.   
 
Source: Nadler, David A. and Tushman, Michael, “A Congruence Model for Diagnosing Organizational 
Behavior” in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin and Joyce S. Osland.  The Organizational Behavior Reader. 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1991) 
Figure 13.  Military/Economic/Political/Social Circumstances and Their 
Relationship with Military Design Factors 
 
The most influential factors for studying the ROK military system are the degree 
of the threat from North Korea and military spending commensurate with the country’s 
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limited budgets for national defense shall be spent by mid- and long-term plans, so as to 
maintain competitive armed forces, and the military systems shall meet the demands of 
the society.  
This chapter uses the conceptual model to explain how 
military/economic/political/social circumstances have influenced the Korean conscription 
systems and how they will also affect  a decision as to what type of military service 
should be implemented in the future.  
 
A. MILITARY FACTORS 
 
1. Military Threats 
After the inter-Korean summit in June 2006 and the Joint Declaration, North 
Korea has maintained a government-level dialogue with South Korea, including 
ministerial talks.  But North Korea has remained unchanged regarding  the “Military-First 
Policy (Songun Chonch’i).”  This policy, in essence,  postulates that “politics which solve 
all problems arising in the revolution and construction on the principle of giving priority 
to the military affair and advance the overall cause of socialism relying on the army as 
the pillar of the revolution.”48   
In spite of its deepening economic difficulties, North Korea continues to 
strengthen its military capability.  North Korea’s defense expenditures are covered by not 
only its national budget, but also by an independent military budget emcompassing 
operations of the munitions industry (secondary economy), weapons exports, and foreign 
currency earning activities of military units.  Its actual military expenditures are estimated 
at over 30 percent of its gross national income (GNI).  Through this policy, North Korea 
continues to maintain its conventional and asymmetrical military capabilites.   
The ROK military has indentifed five major threats from North Korea.49  The first 
threat is nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons.  North Korea’s Korean 
Central News Agency announced that it had successfully conducted an underground 
                                                 
48 “Songun Chonch’i” Global Security, Adapted from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/songun-chongchi.htm; Internet; Accessed 7 March 2007. 
49 Defense White Paper, ROK MND, Seoul, 2004, p. 44. 
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nuclear test on October 9, 2006.  There is no strong evidence indicating that North Korea 
possesses nuclear weapons, but it is suspected that North Korea may have produced one 
or two nuclear weapons with about 10 to 14kg of weapons-grade plutonium after its 
nuclear weapons test.  It is believed that North Korea possesses approximately 2,500 to 
5,000 tons of toxic agents, such as nerve, blister, blood, and vomiting agents, as well as 
tear gas.  The North is suspected of being able to independently cultivate and produce 
such biological weapons as the bacteria of anthrax, smallpox, and cholera. 
Mid/long-range missiles are big threats to South Korea because the Seoul 
metropolitan area is within the range of 170mm self-propelled artillery tubes and 240mm 
multiple rocket launchers deployed in the forward area.  Most of these weapons have 
already been in fixed positions in numerous tunnels near the dimiliarized zone (DMZ) 
and have zeroed in on their targets.  They would be a major means of attack during the 
initial phase of the war scenario.   
Special Operations Forces (SFOs) are also one of the asymmetrical military 
capabilies of North Korea. They could bring huge disorder of the ROK rear area by 
sabotaging war-support facilities and assassinating ROK leaders.  North Korea maintains 
more than 100,000 SFO units trained for deployment into South Korea prior to and 
during the initial phase of a war.    
Armored assets are regarded as important assets even though 70 percent of 
Korean Peninsula consists of mountainous terrain.  It was shown in the Korean War that 
such assets can be very effective.  North Korea maintains about 5,800 tanks,  which is 
over two times more than South Korea has.  North Korea has deployed approximately 70 
percent of its ground forces south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line.  Thus, it is maintaining 
the ability and posture to wage a surprise attack without any redeployment in the event of 
an emergency. 
Further, the air assets of North Korea surpass those of South Korea in quantity.  
There are about 1,380 fixed-wing aircraft owned by the North Korean air force, including 
jet fighters and support aircraft.  They have the capability to support special wafare units, 
such as sniper brigades, infiltrating deep into the South’s rear areas at low-altitudes.  
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To cope with North Korea’s major threats, to be executed in concert with a 
massive concentration of ground forces in the front, South Korea has no option but to 
maintain a massive army.  The relative change of service ratio reflects the global trend 
and growing importance of the navy and air force in modern and future warfare.  
Although the ROK military is required to shift itself from threat-based to capabilities-
based planning in the future,50 the military threat is a very important factor  in reforming 
the ROK’s military structure because North Korea still maintains military power superior 
to that of South Korea in quantitative terms. Massive armed forces would be needed to 
counter a military threat from North Korea, and South Korea may need to maintain a 
conscription system for this reason. 
 
2. The Military Transformation (DRP 2020) 
As shown in Chapter I, the ROK plans to reduce military manpower from its 
current level of 681,000 to 500,000 by 2020.  To make up for the manpower reduction, 
military capabilities will be increased.  Given North Korea’s massive military manpower, 
the defense ministry will undertake this reduction of the nation’s military manpower in 
three phases.  During the first phase, between 2006 and 2010, the army will be cut back 
by 60,000 privates, and 20,000 NCOs  will be added to fill the shortage of skilled privates.  
In the following phase, between 2011 and 2015, an additional 60,000 troops will be cut. 
This will be followed by the downsizing of an additional 80,000 in the third phase, 
between 2016 and 2020, leaving a total of 500,000.  This gradual reduction in manpower 
will address North Korea’s challenges appropriately.51   
Moreover, the defense ministry knows well that a manpower reduction will not 
save the money necessary for the buildup of military capabilities.  Actually, in terms of 
manpower costs, more money will be needed to replace 60,000 privates with 20,000 
NCOs.  The rising costs of a qualitative force-buildup poses a dilemma, because reducing 
military manpower does not provide noticeable cost savings.  Therefore, the defense 
ministry is requesting an increase in the defense budget. 
                                                 
50 Beth Asch and James R. Hosek, “Looking to theFuture: What Does Transformation Mean For 
Military Manpower and Personnel Policy?,” Occasional Paper Series RAND, 2004, p. 4. 
51 “The Defense Reform Plan 2020,” ROK MND, Seoul, 2005. 
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The DRP appears to provide a useful approach to future ROK military forces that 
will enhance ROK capabilities against most future security challenges.  It reflects deep 
thinking about how to improve ROK military capabilities while focusing on the North 
Korean invasion threat.  However, there are some security challenges against which the 
projected DRP forces appear to perform less well than do the current forces; a more 
thorough review of those challenges may be able to identify corrections at reasonable 
costs, along the lines discussed above, in terms of managing ROK risks.   
These efforts to reform the military  define the process to meet the defense goal 
and accommodate achieving a modern military structure.  Many people are wondering 
whether DPR 2020 can succeed because of the budget and security concerns. But in 2020, 
the ROK will still remain as a typical conscript system (e.g., the type between hardcore 
and softcore conscription).  This means that the ROK will need  further steps beyond the 
DRP to adopt an AVF system. 
 
3.  The Trends of a War in the Information-Driven Era and the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
The ROK military service system should be chosen after considering the trends of 
a war in the information-driven era, the potential capacity for military reform of its 
neighboring countries, and the direction of its  plans regarding military strength.  
As depicted in Table 5, the trends of a war in the near future will be characterized 
by information/knowledge-driven victories as well as the battlefield in air and space.  The 
military organization will be a single-layered horizontal network and the 
authorities/responsibilities will be assigned to lower echelons.  As a result, the 
importance of middle echelons decreases, obscuring the distinction between 
commissioned officers/non-commissioned officers.  Also, combat soldiers would be 
equipped with advanced knowledge and information.  The status of a soldier without 
adequate knowledge and information would be likened to that of an unskilled worker in a 
Third-World society.  Hence, armed forces relying on their size, supported by 
conscription-based systems, cannot be as effective in the future when victory is 
determined by information/knowledge.52  
                                                 
52 Tae Young Kwon, “The Trends of a War in the Information-Driven Era,” KIDA, 2003. 
42 
Table 5.  The Trends of a War in the Information-Driven Era 
 
 
Source: Kwon, Tae Young, “The Trends of a War in the Information-Driven Era,” KIDA, 2003. 
 
Table 6 shows the potential for military reform in South Korea’s neighboring 
countries. As seen here, a focus on knowledge and information, and a Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA), suitable for each country’s circumstances, are expected to be 
accomplished between 2020 and 2030.  While the neighboring countries are putting more 
efforts into the new military revolution to meet the demands of an information-driven era, 
if South Korea sticks to its current forces, established during the industrialization era, the 
status of South Korea will shrink all the more, as its present national/military power is 
already inferior to that of its neighbors.  Therefore, it cannot be avoided that Korea 
should pursue “a-few-good-men” systems through RMA and introduce cutting-edge 
military technology in the mid- and long-term plans to cope with the future combat 
environment.  To that end, the operation of human resources should focus on quality 
rather than quantity, requiring the review of a volunteers-driven conscription system or a 
completely voluntary system.   
 
 
• Information/knowledge driven victories 
• The battlefield in air and space 
• A single-layered horizontal network 
• The authorities/responsibilities will be assigned to lower echelons 
- the importance of middle echelons decreases, obscuring the distinction 
between commissioned officers/non-commissioned officers 
• The combat solders are equipped with advanced knowledge and information 
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Table 6.  The Potential for Military Reform in South Korea’s Neighboring 
Countries. 
 
 The Potential Capability 
Russia 
(2020) 
• New Military Doctrine 
   - Advanced prevention as well as reduction and neutralization of 
military threats against the Russian Federation 
• Offensive Defense Strategies 
Japan 
(2025) 
• No. 1 Navy Power in Asia 
• National Defense Program Outline 
- Multi-Functional Flexible Defense Capability Initiative 
• Total Security Strategy  
China 
(2030) 
• Defensive Defense Policies 
• Strategy to Prevail in Local War with Advaced Technology 
• The principle of “One China” 
Source: An, Seok-Ki, Jeong, Joo-Seong, Jeong, Won-Young, “New Environmental Change and 
Development of Military Service”, KIDA, 2003, p. 26. 
 
In view of these conditions, South Korea may need to maintain a conscription 
system for a while.  In the long run, nevertheless, gradual changes should be made to 
enable a quality-focused operation of human resources in line with the trends of future 
combat and the military revolution. 
 
4. The Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense  
The fundamental concept of the cooperative self-reliant defense is that the ROK 
should retain the ability and mechanism to take responsibility for deterring any potential 
provocation by North Korea and repelling any actual provocation, while further 
developing the ROK-U.S. alliance, as well as pursuing external security cooperation 
through military cooperation with neighboring countries and a collective security system, 
as shown in Figure 14. 
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Source: Defense White Paper, ROK MND, Seoul, 2004, p. 94. 
Figure 14.  Concept of Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense 
  
Former President Park Chung-hee once stated that South Korea should build up 
its defense capability to the level that it can defend itself against North Korea’s 
aggression with its own military forces.53  In addition, the ROK should also leverage its 
military alliance with the United States to counter attacks from a North Korean force 
allied with China and Russia.  This concept of a “cooperative self-reliant defense” allows 
ROK greater flexibility in its military force size and structure while ensuring that it can 
defend itself against North Korea’s self-initiated attack. 
Cooperative self-reliant defense is a recent concept pursued by the South Korean 
government.  It has been further expanded in the publication, Peaceful Prosperity and 
National Security, issued by the National Security Council in Seoul in March 2004.54  
Four policy suggestions form the core: peaceful prosperity, balanced and practical 
diplomacy, cooperative self-reliant defense, and comprehensive security.  Although the 
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54 Ibid. 



















lexicon definition of self-reliant defense is to protect one’s own territory from the enemy 
by using one’s own forces, South Korea has, so far, emphasized security cooperation with 
other states as a necessary means of achieving “self-reliant” defense.  In other words, the 
ROK will leverage its military alliances to defend the Korean Peninsula even as it 
remains the primary actor responsible for its own security, unhindered by outside 
influence.   
However, according to U.S. military transformation in Korea, the first step the 
ROK should take is to reach an agreement on the level of cooperation and then improve 
the self-reliant capability, through which the nation can cope with any possible challenges 
that it might confront in the future.  Cooperative self-reliant defense aims to minimize 
any instability in defense posture against North Korea and discord with the United States 
and to build up defense capabilities that are less-affected by the changing security 
environment.55  The ROK needs to bolster the readiness of its combat forces, develop the 
capability to counter North Korea’s WMD threats, enhance management capability, 
create a firm foundation for developing the ROK’s own military technology, adjust 
military structure, and develop operating systems to build an advanced, elite, defense 
force.   
The cooperative self-reliant defense is fundamental and is a good way of deterring 
neighboring countries.  At present, the structure of manpower in the military should aim 
at independent national defense. In line with this goal, a sharp reduction in the number of 
soldiers or a drastic shift to a voluntary system would not be practical; a gradual approach 
is essential.   
 
5.  Technological Capability 
Technology in the military is another factor in the ROK military manpower force 
structure.  Technology can help downsize the traditional ROK military by introducing 
new command-and-control capacities and high-tech weapons systems.  Research and 
development (R&D) on military technology and the acquisition of war materials are the  
 
                                                 
55 Defense White Paper, ROK MND, Seoul, 2004, p. 95. 
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foundations for force improvement, as well as tools to generate creative ideas for national 
defense.  The development of domestic military technology could thus be a cornerstone 
for realizing a self-reliant defense.   
In fact, the ROK army has been reliant on the supply of core technologies and 
imported finished goods from abroad, failing to support the ROK civilian defense 
industry in developing military technology.  This is because the ROK priority lies in early 
militarization to defend against intermittent threats from North Korea.  Although the 
global military industry has improved cutting-edge military technology, the ROK has 
focused on efforts to build superiority over North Korea in terms of military capability.  
This has resulted in a wide gap between military technology and highly-improved 
technology in general, insufficient investment in domestic R&D, and heavy dependence 
on foreign technology.  All these problems should be resolved through investment in 
improving military technology but, at the same time, the ROK should consider 
restructuring of the military for greater efficiency in a practical sense.   
South Korea also has developed independent military technology through the 
Agency for Defense Development (ADD) and has put efforts into the introduction of a 
technology-driven army.  For example, the new, self-propelled artillery system (K-9) has 
reduced the number of soldiers needed to operate the weapon through an automatic 
electronics system and has enhanced its accuracy, thus increasing combat effectiveness.  
Such trends can reduce the number of soldiers required and improve military service 
systems. 
 
B. ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
1. The Effect of Economic Situation of South Korea 
Despite the strong value of South Korea’s won in the foreign currency exchange 
market and high oil prices, its economy is expected to grow around 5 percent in 2006, 
potentially surpassing a growth rate of 4.8 percent for the first time since 2002.  Robust 
growth in 2006 resulted from an increase in domestic consumption and investment and 
better-than-expected export performance. 
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Sluggish job growth is primarily due to the economy’s slow recovery.  Despite a 
fairly robust economic recovery, job creation has lagged in 2006.  Around 300,000 new 
jobs are estimated to have been created in 2006, far short of the government’s target of 
400,000.  According to current statistics, 295,000 new jobs were created on average per 
month from January to November of 2006.56  
Military recruiting is affected by the economic situation and government policy 
for creating jobs.  Recently, the government has begun to put top priority on creating jobs.  
A number of governmental bodies have scrambled to come up with plans to create more 
jobs.  However, the chances for success seem low, since most of the policies lack 
consistency.  In addition, the policies focus only on “job creation” itself rather than on a 
fundamental approach that would create greater demand for labor.  The unemployment 
problem is not confined to the ROK. Job creation has become the biggest agenda item of 
governments in many major countries.  Nevertheless, it does not appear that all these 
countries have been entirely successful in actually creating jobs.57 
Job creation is made more difficult as companies strive to maximize production, 
using a minimal workforce, to survive recessionary trends and fierce competition.  
Companies are also increasingly selling off unprofitable businesses, shifting into higher 
value-added ones, and pushing for automation and outsourcing.  Aside from downsizing 
or streamlining, Korean firms are increasingly reluctant to hire new workers, given the 
overly burdensome increase in mandatory social insurance and unstable labor relations.  
High rates of unemployment can have a positive effect on recruiting soldiers.  In 
particular, the number of applicants for commissioned/noncommissioned officers 
increased after the International Monetary Fund (IMF) crisis in 1997, enhancing the 
overall level of qualification for the job.  But this phenomenon might have happened 
temporarily, according to the economic situation at that time, so we cannot say that it is 
good for introducing a voluntary system.  
Nevertheless, in terms of economic power, Korea is ranked 10th in the world; its 
gross national product (GNP) per capita is only $13,000, far short of $20,000 that is 
                                                 
56 Samsung Economic Research Institute, “Korea Economic Trends,” Vol. 12, No.1, 2007, p. 14. 
57 Ibid., p. 15. 
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required for introducing a voluntary system.58  But absolute economic superiority over 
the North and a rise in military spending due to an increasing GNP would facilitate the 
introduction of a voluntary system.   
 
2. Defense Budget Structure 
The military defense budget can be divided into two major parts: force 
investments program (FIP) and ordinary operational costs (OOC), as shown in Table 7.  
Force investments aim “to secure capabilities to tackle existing threats first and 
subsquently to brace for unspecified future threats, while strengthening domestic R&D 
capabilities at the same time.”59  Ordinary operational costs focus primarily on improving 
soldiers’ morale and welfare, digitizing national defense systems, consolidating education 
and training, meeting the requirements to preserve the exiting combat force, and 
enhancing public confidence.60  Table 7 illustrates the amount and functional allocation 
of the general account of the defense budget. 
 
Table 7.  The ROK Nominal Defense Budget, FY 2004 – FY 2005 
               Unit :trillion Won 
Classification FY2004 FY2005 Increase 
Total Expenditure 18.9412 100 % 20.8226 100 % 1.8814 9.9 % 
FIP costs 6.2930 33.2 % 7.0656 33.9 % 0.7726 12.3 %
OOC 12.6492 66.8 % 13.7570 66.1 % 1.1088 8.8 % 
Source: Defense White Paper, ROK MND, Seoul, 2004, p. 212. 
 
The force investment budget is used to develop key defense capabilities for self-
reliant defense.  In particular, there is an urgent need to improve deterrent capabilities in 
the areas of surveillance and precision attacks.  Another major priority is the development 
                                                 
58 Korea National Statistical Office (KMSO), Available from http://www.nso.go.kr/; Internet; 
Accessed 19 March 2007. 
59 Defense White Paper , ROK MND, Seoul, 2004, p. 210. 
60 Ibid., p. 211. 
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of ROK’s military technology to domestically produce weapons systems.  South Korea 
also intends to modernize its current armed forces to optimize their deployment and 
ensure battle-readiness, which requires substantial and timely funding for supplies as well 
as maintenance of weapons and equipment.61 
The increased expenditure on operations and maintenance (O&M) reflect 
concerns over the morale and welfare of the soldiers.  The improvement of living 
conditions in the barracks and wages are top priorities.  Other crucial concerns in the 
formulation of the defense budget include intelligence and defense technology to prepare 
for future warfare, education and training programs for soldiers to boost battle-readiness, 























Sourse: Defense White Paper , ROK MND, Seoul, 2004, p. 215. 
Figure 15.  Defense in Government Budgets and GDP 
 
The nominal amount of the ROK defense expenditure has grown, as shown in 
Table 7.  But the real ratio of the defense budgets, as displayed in Figure 15, have been 
declining due to some factors such as market prices, increased salaries in line with the 
growing national income, and the high cost of advanced weapons systems.  This ratio 
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62 Ibid. 
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dropped to 2.8 percent in 2000 from approximately 6 percent in the early 1980s.  As a 
result, the ROK military has not had the flexibility to foster a cooperative self-reliant 
national defense.    
To steadily build up a self-reliant defense force, the MND will work closely with  
other government agencies to raise the defense expenditure in stages taking into account 
national economic conditions.  The MND aims to appropriate 3.2 percent of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) for national defense by 2008.  This translates into an annual  
increase in the defense budget of approximately 11 percent.63   
An increase in the defense budget is required to build a technology-centered force 
for South Korea.  Two years have passsed since the South Korean government declared 
its intention to build self-reliant defense capabilities.  South Korea needs to allocate 
sufficient resources to do so even as it focuses on new defense concepts, reform, and 
detailed projects.  Although the FY 2005 and mid-term defense budgets reflected the 
government’s intention to pursue a self-reliant defense, they were inadequate.  It is 
anticipated that South Korea will enjoy a 5 percent real growth rate in the future or an 8 
percent nominal growth rate taking into account inflation.  This falls short of the required 
9-10 percent annual increase in the defense budget.  Intensified efforts and a national 
consensus will need to be forged to ensure that the appropriate defense budget is  
allocated.64 
The ROK military is sustained by the defense budgets appropriated by the 
congress.  But even if the ROK MND gain approval of next fiscal year’s defense budget 
from the President, the congress sometimes cuts the defense budget.  The ROK 
government has recently adopted a new method to pre-allocate resources  and announced 
the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for the FY 2004-2008 budget.65  The 
Ministry of Budget and Planning begins to allocate the budget in a lump sum at the 
earliest stage to help each ministry strategically allocate its budget to meet its own needs 
and have more authority.  Thus, it is timely and necessary for the MND to implement a 
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new defense budget model that adjusts to the changes in the overall government budget.  
For this purpose, a mid-term defense budget should be drawn up through planning and 
programming of the Planning Programming & Budgeting System (PPBS), which might 
be a significant step toward target-oriented (rather than habitual and incremental) 
budgeting. 
Due to the high spending in manpower management, modernization of military 
equipment is being addressed by mid- and long-term plans.  Given that  additional 
spending is needed, because of reduced military service terms as well as increased 
budgets due to a larger number of noncommissioned officers in 2006, reduction in service 
terms and conversion to a voluntary system are not likely for some time; and, thus, a 
stable increase of military budgets would be guaranteed first. 
 
C. POLITICAL FACTORS 
 
1. Security Situation in Northeast Asia 
The global security environment is constantly changing as it is affected by many 
uncertain factors, including the economy, technology, the climate, and so on.  This 
neccessitates a change from a military-centered security framwork toward a broad 
security paradigm.  As such, military reform will be geared toward building a 
qualitatively strong and bold army, moving away from a quantitatively large army that 
derives its strength merely on the number of personnel.   
Geographically, only the ROK’s four immediate neighbors (Japan, China, Russia 
and North Korea) and their allies can carry out an invasion.  However, it is unlikely for 
some of them to do so.  For example, Japan does not have a force anywhere close to what 
would be required size to launch an attack, and Russia has an even smaller force 
deployed within a thousand kilometers of Korea.   
In general, there is increasing economic cooperation and interdependence among 
Northeast Asian countries given tension alleviation and promotion of cooperation around 
the world after the Cold War.  Nevertheless, there are several sources of potential 
regional friction, such as the North Korean nuclear issue, cross-strait relations, and 
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possible territorial disputes over some islands and territories.  Furthermore, several of the 
countries that have marshaled the world’s largest military forces, such as China, are 
constantly trying to expand their influence in the region.66   
The U.S. acts as a “balancer” in Northeast Asia through its ROK-U.S. and U.S.-
Japan alliances.  Presently, the U.S. is actively trying to deter nuclear development by 
North Korea and has pressed on North Korea to participate in the Six-Party Talks.  U.S. 
government policies affecting the size and role of U.S. troops in Korea have a 
tremendous impact on the security of the Korean Peninsula.67 
China also acts as a balancer in the region, given its diplomatic ties with both 
Koreas.  For example, China plays a key role in the Six-Party Talks, although the primary 
players are the US and North Korea.  China supports the  denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula as it seeks a peaceful Northeast Asia to achieve its national goal of 
“modernizing the country through economic development”68   
Although the scope of its Self-Defense Force is limited, Japan incurred the 
world’s third largest defense expenditure in 2006 after the U.S. and Russia, due in part to 
its close military alliance with the U.S.69  Japan has tried to expand its military influence 
and is promoting proactive security dialogues/exchanges with regional countries.  
Potential disputes between Korea and Japan remain, as evidenced by Japan’s distortion of 
its wartime history, Dokdo island, and visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese leaders.  
The co-operation of both countries is required for the establishment of a long-lasting 
partnership. 
Russia, for its part, is trying to restore its influence on the Korean Peninsula and 
expand its role in Northeast Asia.  Russia is playing an active role in helping to resolve 
the North Korean nuclear impasse and has strong interests in linking the Trans-Siberian 
Railway (TSR) with the Trans-Korea Railway (TKR) for its gas pipes.70 
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In terms of geopolitics, world powers have had keen interests in South Korea, and 
the issue of the ownership of islands between Japan and China can cause a local war at 
any time.  There has been potential for conflict  with neighboring countries around Korea, 
and concerns over terrorism have increased in the world, posing threats to national 
defense for a considerable period.  Moreover, the increased military spending of the 
neighboring countries through military reforms and potential local conflicts in the area 
significantly affect Korea’s security.  Such military powers might pose a high threat to 
Korea, which is a good reason to maintain conscription.  
 
2. Future Development of the ROK-U.S. Military Alliance 
By entering into the “Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and 
the United States of America” on October 1, 1953, the two countries established an 
alliance based on mutual interests of freedom and peace.  This treaty marked the 
beginning of an official military alliance between the two countries to jointly deal with an 
external armed attack with the U.S. bringing in military troops into Korea for its defense.  
As a legal basis for the joint defense system between the two countries, the treaty 
provided basic understanding for subsequent agreements regarding national security and 
military matters, for example, the “Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).”  The treaty is 
significant from political, diplomatic, as well as national security perspectives, providing 
the primary tool for South Korea and the U.S. to collaboratively cope with aggressive 
moves from the other countries.71 
By repressing the potential threats toward South Korea, the treaty has contributed 
tremendously to peace in the Northeast Asian region for the past five decades.  In the 
meantime, South Korea has grown strong enough to take charge in defending itself as 
compared to the past, when it heavily depended on the U.S. for necessary supplies and 
training.  The military capability of South Korea was demonstrated to the world with its 
participation in the Gulf War in 1991 and the recent dispatch of air force as well as 
medical support for the anti-terrorism military operations in Afghanistan.  
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Since the summit meeting between Korea and the U.S in 2000, Korea has 
endeavored to improve its relationship with North Korea, paving the way toward 
reconciliation with continual exchanges.  As the U.S took on new strategic tasks, 
including its own defense against terrorism, and realigned its national security 
arrangements as part of the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR),72 it has restructured 
its military operations within Korea.   
Changes in the security environment have also affected the dynamics of ROK-US 
relations. The recent “anti-U.S. sentiments” among the young Korean generation have 
reached an alarming level.  Similarly, anti-Korean sentiments are observed among the 
U.S. senators.  Such developments have been somewhat exaggerated by the media, given 
that the overall alliance between the two countries remains strong.  
Despite strong military co-operation, a new approach for the alliance needs to be 
sought.  That is, security efforts based on mere regional relationships are not sufficient 
anymore; a future-oriented collaboration needs to be developed that can effectively deal 
with new sets of threats that include terrorism, weapons of mass  destruction, human 
rights, and environmental issues.73  Korea should gradually increase its military power 
under the U.S. umbrella to cope with unstable international environments.  Following the 
example of Germany, Korea should pursue gradual changes in its military service system.  
There is also a need to resolve several issues, given the restructuring of U.S. operations, 
such as moving of the Yongsan base and a transfer of the wartime operational command.  
In any case, the alliance should be maintained, for such a relationship with the U.S. is 
absolutely essential to sustain South Korea’s economy and security.    
 
D. SOCIAL FACTORS 
 
1. Highlights of the Population Structure 
It is predicted that the population growth rate in Korea will trend toward null, due 
to the declining birth rate as well as the birth-limit policy introduced by the gorvernment.  
                                                 
72 Du Hyeogn Cha, “The Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance: Toward the Evolution of a Strategy 
Cooperation Alliance,” KIDA, 2004, p. 6. 
73 Ibid., p. 10. 
55 
Korean society will reflect an aging population due to the prolonged life expectancy from 
the improvement of the medical system as well as the declining birth rate.  
According to Table 8, as of 2005, the population growth rate is 0.21 percent.  The 
population growth rate is projected to be 0.26 percent and 0.02 percent in 2010 and 2018, 
respectively.  Then, the population growth rate will decrease to 0.00 percent, -0.25 
percent, and -1.07 percent in 2019, 2030, and 2050, respectively.74 
 
Table 8.  Trends in the Total Population and Population Growth Rate 
(Unit: thousand persons, %) 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2010 2018 2020 2030 2050 
Total Population 32,241 38,124 42,869 47,008 48,138 48,875 49,340 49,326 48,635 42,343
Population Growth 
Rate 
2.21 1.57 0.99 0.84 0.21 0.26 0.02 -0.02 -0.25 -1.07 
Note : Population growth rate refers to the increase over the previous year. 
Source: Adapted from Korea National Statistical Office (KMSO), Available from http://www.nso.go.kr/; 
Internet; Accessed 5 March 2007. 
 
Birth rates, which were 2.8 people per woman in 1980 and 1.6 people in 1990, are 
predicted to fall to 1.4 people in the future.  Due to these results, the portion of the 
younger population will drop drastically, but the portion of the population aged 35 to 54 
and 60 and over will increase, as shown in Figure 16.  Korea is predicted to become an 
aged society by 2018.75 
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Source: Adapted from Korea National Statistical Office (KMSO), Available from http://www.nso.go.kr/; 
Internet; Accessed 5 March 2007. 
Figure 16.  Population of the Service-Age Male and the Changing Population 
Structure 
 
These trends in the population structure are a critical factor for policy regarding 
the military service system.  The low birth rates, reduced youth population, and an aging 
society would call for a decrease in the number of soldiers, a reduced number of those in 
alternative service, and adjusting the eligibility for enlistment.  The low birth rates, which 
mean fewer children, would be an obstacle to increasing the appeal of military service.  In 
turn, the conversion into a voluntary system would be more difficult.  
Moreover, with a standing army of 690,000, the scale is too great to introduce a 
voluntary system now.  The soldier ratio of 1.45 percent, compared with the population, 
is much higher than 0.5 percent, indicating that a conscription system is still needed to 
meet manpower requirements.  
Although the youth population is expected to decrease, a new type of military 
resource  is likely to increase. First of all, the social participation of women has expanded, 
and the need for competent women in the military sector may likewise increase.  Along 
with the structural changes in the population, national policies are promoting utilization 
of the female population as military officials. So, women would be given more chances in 
the military field.  
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2. Social Perspective toward Military Service 
Table 9 shows related results from a KIDA survey (2000 and 2003) on national 
perceptions of military service.  Perceptions of the equity in the military are relatively 
low, with over 56 percent of respondents indicating “unfair.”  Regarding the possibility 
for misconduct due to system diversity, 54 percent of people answered that there is a high 
chance for such misconduct.   
 
Table 9.  National Perception of Military Service 
Topic Results 
Equity of the service • fair 48.8%    (very 1.5%, roughly 42.3%) • unfair 56.2% (very 11.4%, roughly 44.8%) 
Possibility for 
misconduct due to 
system diversity 
• yes 53.8% 
• mediocrity 32.8% 
• no 13.5% 
Will try to avoid the 
service if possible 
• yes 79.4% 
• mediocrity 12.2% 
• no 8.3% 
Will report the fact 
when I am aware of 
military service 
misconduct 
• yes 4.5% 
• mediocrity 10.2% 
• no 85.2% 
 
Source: An, Seok-Ki, Jeong, Joo-Seong, Jeong, Won-Young, “New Environmental Change and 
Development of Military Service”, KIDA, 2003, p. 60. 
 
A strong majority of people (79 percent) stated that they would try to avoid 
military service, if possible..  Meanwhile, 85.2 percent of people claimed that they  would 
not report  misconduct if they were aware of it.  Apparently, many people tend to criticize 
misconduct in the military; yet, they would also attempt to avoid service themselves and 
purposely fail to report misconduct.  These are interesting double standards for people, 
when thinking about the military and popular perceptions of service.  
The ROK military has developed a negative image stemming from several 
incidents: the ongong allegation of military exemptions for a siginificant number of sons 
of public figures; the scandal of the army general promotion board; the shooting rampage 
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by a corporal at the barracks in the DMZ, and the accidental crash of air force jet fighters.  
Public awareness of the military is quite negative due to suicides or desertions caused by 
beatings and assaults in the past, draft-dodging by celebrities and children of  high 
officials, and the influence and activities of organizations that were oppressed by the 
military regime.  Despite the efforts of the military to reduce corruption and bring 
transparent administration, suicide or desertion cases  have a fatal influence on the image 
of the military.  Such negative impressions of the military have resulted in  calls for 
changes in the service system.  The ROK must not overlook social factors in terms of  
public attitudes toward military service.  This is crucial, because social support for the 
ROK military is based on compulsory service.  The ROK military must attempt to get the 
full support of society, concentrating more efforts on building trust before attempting to 
introduce an AVF. 
Social changes also affect the maintenance and recruitment of soldiers.  The 
improved quality of life nationally may have reduced the appeal of military service to 
young people.  There will be a constant demand for enhanced environments and welfare 
in the military, causing military spending to rise. Furthermore, respondents of the latest 
survey answered that they would not join the army, although they wanted a voluntary 
service system.  This implies that recruitment of soldiers could be a major challenge if a 
voluntary system were introduced.  
 
E. ANALYSIS OF ROK MILITARY MANPOWER FORCE STRUCTURE 
FACTORS 
This chapter examines existing factors that influence future manpower force 
planning of the ROK military based on the conceptual model to determine whether the 
ROK military manpower force structure factors are suitable for an all-volunteer system.  
Various factors determinine an appropriate military service system and identify details 
of the structure in accordance with various internal and external considerations.  Figure 
17 shows influential factors in selecting a type of military service from security, 
economic, social, and political domains to achieve the maximum national security. 





Figure 17.  Military/Economic/Political/Social Circumstances Used in 
Determining the Military Service System 
 
1. Military Factors 
The military threat is a very important factor in reforming the ROK military 
structure, because North Korea still maintains military power superior to that of South 
Korea in quantitative terms.  The ROK military also must include potential threats from 
neighboring militaries.  So, maintaining draft enlistment is appropriate to induce the 
transition to softcore conscription from hardcore through DRP 2020 and for a cooperative 
and independent national defense.  
 
2. Economic Factors 
High rates of unemployment can have positive effects on recruiting soldiers; 
however this phenomenon  may vary according to the ecomomic situation, so we cannot 
say that it necessarily supports a voluntary system.  In terms of economic power, Korea is 
ranked 10th in the world, but  has yet to achieve the per capita income of $20,000 needed 
to maintain voluntary recruitment. 
 












-Social Perspective  











The operational costs are high,  as is the investment needed for defensive strength 
improvements.  That is, draft enlistment is necessary in terms of manpower acquisition 
and budgets due to the current size of the army.  
 
3. Political Factors 
Due to Korea’s geopolitical location, there is a potential for conflicts with 
neighboring countries.  At the same time, concerns over terrorism have increased 
throughout the world, posing threats to the national defense for a considerable period. 
Moreover, the increased military spending of the neighboring countries through military 
reforms significantly affect Korea’s security.  Such military powers might pose a high 
threat to Korea, which is a good reason to maintain conscription.  
The ROK-U.S. alliance should also be maintained in a constructive way, meeting 
the needs of the times.  Besides the reinforced alliance, Korea needs military aid from the 
U.S. to build up its military strength.  The ROK should pursue gradual changes of 
military service systems while under the U.S. security umbrella to cope with unstable 
international environments. 
 
4. Social Factors 
Decreasing birth rates and the changing population structure make it harder to 
maintain such a massive army based on draft enlistment.  Further, a reduced service term, 
supposed to alleviate a burden on the people, will make it all the more difficult to secure 
the necessary manpower.   
The ROK must not overlook social factors in terms of the people’sperspective 
toward military service.  This is crucial, because social support for the ROK military is 
based on compulsory conscription.  The ROK military has had a negative image from 
several recent incidents.  The ROK military must attempt to obtain the full support of 
society, concentrating greater effort on building trust before attempting to introduce an 
AVF.    
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. OVERVIEW FOR SERVICE SYSTEM AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
1. Decision for Service System  
This study aims to evaluate the feasibilty of introducing voluntary recruitment in 
Korea.  The nationls current military system is first specified, using critical indicators for 
defining types of military recuitment.  Then, the study examines whether the 
military/economic/political/social factors of Korea are suitable for voluntary recruitment 




Source: Nadler, David A. and Tushman, Michael, “A Congruence Model for Diagnosing 
Organizational Behavior,” in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin and Joyce S. Osland., The Organizational 
Behavior Reader, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1991). 
 
Figure 18.  A Conceptual Model of the Defense Organization. 
 
According to the indices of military design factors, the Korean army operates a 
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conscription if it seeks to introduce volunteer-driven combined recruitment.  That is, 
maintaining the draft for a time is unavoidable.  Figure 19 shows that most European 
countries have adopted volunteer-driven recruitment after first introducing softcore 
conscription.  Also, most developed countries that use all-volunteer recruitment have 
brought changes gradually as follows: hardcore conscription, then softcore conscription, 




Source: Haltiner, Karl W. “The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe,” Armed 
Forces and Society, Vol 25, 1998, p. 18. 
Figure 19.  A Typology of Force Structure and Expected Changes 
 
The military factors facing Korea demonstrate that the North, equipped with 
nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as conventional weaponry, may pose a threat to 
the nation for some time to come.  So, maintaining the draft is appropriate to induce the 
transition from hardcore to softcore conscription through DRP 2020 for a cooperative and 
independent defense.  More importantly, the future trends of warfare and the 
development of military technology will accelerate such a transition.  
In terms of economic power, Korea has yet to achieve the per capita income of 
$20,000 needed to maintain all-volunteer recruitment.  In addition, the military budget 
Type III  (Hardcore Conscript Force)  
Conscription Ratio : above 66% 
Korea, Taiwan, Greece, Turkey, Switzerland 
Type II  (Softcore Conscript Force) 
Conscription Ratio : between 50% and 66% 
Sweden, Norway, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
Type 0 (All-Volunteer Forces) 
Zero-Draft 
United States, United Kingdom, France, Ireland, Japan 
Type I  (Pseudo Conscript Force) 
Conscription Ratio : below 50% 
Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium 
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continues to decrease compared with the GNP.  Operational costs are high, while 
investment is also needed for defensive strength improvement.  That is, the draft is 
necessary for manpower acquisition and budgets due to the relatively large size of the 
army.  
Because of its geopolitical location, Korea still faces a potential for conflict with 
neighboring countries. The possibility for increased terrorism in the world will help to 
define national defense needs for a considerable period.  Moreover, increased military 
spending by neighboring countries through military reforms significantly affect Korea’s 
security.  Additionally, the ROK-U.S. alliance should be maintained in a constructive 
way, meeting the needs of the times.  Besides the reinforced alliance, Korea requires 
military aid from the U.S. to build up its military strength.  
Given that nearly all young people currently seek to attend college, and the 
public’s perception of the military is quite negative, manpower acquisition is expected to 
be difficult.  At the same time, the decreasing birth rates and a changing population 
structure make it harder to maintain such a massive army based on the draft.  And a 
reduced service term, intended to alleviate a burden on the people, will make it all the 
more difficult to secure manpower.  As a result, women’s participation in the military is 
expected to increase, as they become more involved in social activities recently.  
In summary, the draft should be maintained for the near future, but this does not 
necessarily mean hardcore conscription.  In the long run, a gradual transition to voluntary 
recruitment appears necessary to develop a quality-focused approach to military 
resources that is in line with national defense reforms and the changing aspects of warfare.  
That is, the ROK should consider a phase-to-phase transition to a volunteer-driven 








2.  Basis of the Military System under the Draft System 
 
a.  Adjusting the Size of the Armed Forces 
Downsizing Korea’s armed forces appears critical to quality improvement 
in the military.  To have professional manpower, investment per solider should increase, 
which is hardly expected if the current size of the army is maintained.  No  absolute plan 
is offered to downsize the armed forces, because the plan should be connected with the 
transition of the military structure.  A few previous studies suggest 500,000 soldiers as a 
proper target by 2015, and the latest national defense reform plans include the same 
number by 2020.76  Along with these efforts, the composition of military manpower 
should be adjusted to establish a technology-driven army with even higher rates in the 
navy and air force as well as among the civilian defense administration.  
 
b. Composition by Rank 
To establish an army with professional soldiers, the proprtion of 
commissioned/non-commissioned officers in the army, selected through voluntary 
recruitment, should be increased.  Though the range of such ratios can vary, the available 
budgets and civilian manpower, as well as the costs, should be taken into account.  The 
national defense reform plans of the MND suggest that the ratio of officers to enlisted 
personnel should be 40:60 by 2020 (25:75 at present).  For reference, a 40-50 percent 
ratio is common in developed countries such as the U.S., Britain, and Germany.  To bring 
about this change, the scale of reduction should be determined in advance for each rank.  
Application of the same reduction scale to each rank would not contribute to the 
improved structure of military manpower.  Merely eliminating enlisted personnel would 
not assure more effective manpower operations, although such a plan may improve the 
structure itself.  Thus, the scale-down should be largely applied to privates, and less to 
commissioned and non-commissioned officers.  In particular, the ratio of NCOs should 
be relatively higher, to increase technical staffs.  A war in modern times relies heavily on 
the use of advanced equipment, and it is often operated by NCOs in combat.  
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c. Composition by Service Terms 
The ratio of short-term and mandatory-service soldiers should be reduced 
while long-term and voluntary-service soldiers increase.  In line with this goal, the 
positions of commissioned officers should be filled with only volunteers, phase by phase.  
By doing so, passive military service, as a part of mandatory service, can be avoided 
while the minimum service term can be lengthened.  To that end, of course, a military 
unit requiring a smaller number of officers in the lower ranks should be promoted so that 
the number of officers can be reduced as well as the service term.  As to privates 
conscripted, the number should go down steadily, while paid volunteers may be able to 
work longer in the army through a contract as an effort to secure experienced soldiers.  
 
d. Composition by Divisions/Skills 
Emphasis should be placed on technology-equipped forces. Compared 
with combat soldiers, more experts are required in information, telecommunications, and 
computers.  Regarding military officers, the ratio of those with advanced technical skills 
should increase while civilian manpower with special skills can be utilized if the proper 
system were provided.  When privates are assigned to military units, their major and 
skills should be taken fully into account.  Meanwhile, a war in the future would be more 
complex, so that an integrated system would be more fitting rather than the currently 
fractionized units and skill utilization systems.  
 
e. Effective Use of the Female Population 
To make better use of the female population, the proportion of women in 
the army should be raised.  This plan should be pursued positively, with any special 
qualities of a female taken into account for effective operation through improved service 
systems and working environments.  The utilization of the female population is one of the 
major issues in the military sector.  In view of changing social environments and military 
operations, it would be advantageous to increase participation by women.  
In terms of changing trends in warfare and manpower acquisition, the 
potential for utilizing female soldiers is increasing as dependency on physical strength 
66 
declines and modern warfare evolves with technological advancement.  Cutting-edge 
equipment and information systems will play an increasingly larger role, and various non-
combat military functions such as peace-keeping and operations other than war open 
increasingly more opportunities for service by women. 
Also, the future status of military manpower acquisition substantiates the 
need for utilizing the female population.  The drastic decrease in birth rates leads to a 
generally smaller number of available youths, and an extended voluntary enlistment 
system in the future would accelerate this trend all the more.  Therefore, the demand for 
competent female soldiers would increase. 
 
B. CONCLUSION 
To maintain a technology-driven army, the ROK military service system needs to 
be properly facilitated.  It is recommended that the size of the army be reduced, 
alleviating a burden on the people, and a reliance on professionals be expanded through 
voluntary enlistment.  Nevertheless, when an army of 500,000 is maintained, the 
transition to a voluntary system from draft enlistment may be difficult in terms of 
available budgets and manpower acquisition. Without changing the framework of the 
mandatory system, therefore, the ratio of conscripts should be reduced while that of 
volunteers be increased, providing opportunities to select various ways of performing 
military duties.   This means that the army would need to transition from draftee-driven 
combined recruitment to a volunteer-driven system.  
In addition, the service term of conscripts should be reduced by phases, while the 
proportion of non-commissioned officers is increased to secure experienced soldiers. A 
partial volunteer system can also be applied to privates.  Besides, the military service 
system needs to be focused on developing more professionals.  In general, mid-/long-
term and a voluntary system should be given the priority rather than a short-term and 
mandatory system, especially as service-by-contract can add flexibility to manpower 
operations.  This means that commissioned/non-commissioned officers be hired mainly 
through a voluntary system, but with a longer service term through a contract. In 
particular, complete voluntary recruitment needs to be applied to commissioned officers 
in phases so that only professional soldiers with a contract can fill the position.   
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In promoting the downsizing of the army, it is important to establish the target 
manpower objectives and to formulate systematic reduction plans.  In this process, an 
agreement on the goal and methods can be formulated carefully both inside and outside 
of the army, to prevent unease and unrest within the organization.  It is also important to 
develop programs to downsize the army systematically, according to manpower types 
such as ranks and service terms.  With these changes, the ROK military can successfully 
meet the defense needs of the future as it has done so well before.  Through the 
implement the reform consistently, the ROK military will have more flexible manpower 
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